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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Trespass to chattels is a somewhat vague tort action that traditionally 
arises out of the intentional and unauthorized dispossession, use, or 
interference with the tangible chattel of another.1  Claims predicated on 
this common law tort have always required the showing of some 
intentional physical damage to or, in the alternative, dispossession of the 
chattel.2  However, in a recent California appellate decision,3 the court 
departed from the strict common law requirements and upheld a 
permanent injunction on the grounds of trespass to chattels,4 thereby 
enjoining conduct that would have traditionally fallen outside the 
purview of the established trespass doctrines.  In doing so, the court 
created a new tort, formerly known as trespass to chattels, but no longer 
recognizable as such, and destroyed the very elements, reasons, and 
foundations upon which that tort had been established.  The court’s 
decision stands in opposition to all prior legal authority on point, is 
unjustified, creates absurd results, and has enormous adverse 
consequences.  This Casenote addresses the court’s erroneous and 
unjustified application of trespass to chattels in an area where it is 
completely inapplicable. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Factual History 
Over a two-year period, Kourosh Kenneth Hamidi, a former Intel 
Corporation5 engineer and the principal spokesperson of Former and 
 
 1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965). 
 2. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 3. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Ct. App. 2001), review granted, 
43 P.3d 587 (Cal. 2002). 
 4. Id. at 246. 
 5. Intel Corporation was founded in 1968 and built the world’s first microprocessor in 
1971.  Intel Corp., About Intel, at http://www.intel.com/intel/index.htm?iid=Corporate+ 
Header_About& (last visited Dec. 19, 2002).  Intel Corporation is one of the world’s 
largest and most successful developers of computer chips, motherboards, systems, 
software, networking, and communications equipment.  “Intel’s mission is to be the 
preeminent building block supplier to the Internet economy.”  Intel Corp., Corporate 
Overview, at http://www.intel.com/pressroom/CorpOverview.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 
2002).  Intel currently employs over 80,000 employees, achieved over $26.5 billion in 
revenues in 2001, and is ranked forty-first in the Fortune 500.  Intel Corp., About Intel, at 
http://www.intel.com/intel/index.htm?iid=Corporate+Header_About& (last visited Dec. 19, 
2002). 
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Current Employees of Intel (FACE Intel),6 sent six unsolicited e-mail 
messages7 targeting up to 35,000 Intel employees at their work e-mail 
addresses, which were maintained on Intel’s privately owned computer 
system.8 
These six messages expressed Hamidi’s view that Intel was engaged 
in abusive and discriminatory employment practices.9  The e-mail 
messages did not originate on Intel’s property nor were they sent to 
Intel’s property.  The e-mail messages were sent over the Internet and 
received by an Internet server.10  The recipients were given the 
opportunity to be removed from Hamidi’s mailing list; however, only 
450 availed themselves of that opportunity.11 
Perhaps disturbed by the content12 of Hamidi’s messages, Intel sent 
 
 6. FACE Intel describes itself as a California nonprofit organization consisting of 
both current and former Intel employees.  See FACE Intel, Intel’s Lawsuit Against Ken 
Hamidi, at http://www.faceintel.com/intellawsuit.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2002).  It was 
created to provide a discussion forum for Intel employees to express concerns and post 
allegations of Intel’s discriminatory and oppressive human rights practices.  FACE Intel, 
at http://www.faceintel.com (last visited Oct. 13, 2002).  The organization’s self-
proclaimed mission is the dedication to “practicing and promoting peaceful and non-
violent opposition to unjust Human Resources policies and practices of Intel” and further 
“to influence Intel to . . . stop age, disability, race, gender, and ethnicity discriminations.”  
Id.  FACE Intel is a defaulting party to the original action and has not appealed the 
court’s decision.  Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246. 
 7. Hamidi’s messages contained a brief description regarding the existence, 
purpose, and goals of FACE Intel and provided the recipients with the Internet address 
for the organization’s Web site.  See E-mail Messages Sent to Intel Employees: Intel vs. 
Hamidi, at http://www.intelhamidi.com/emailmessages.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2002). 
 8. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246–47. 
 9. For the content of Hamidi’s messages, see E-mail Messages Sent to Intel 
Employees: Intel vs. Hamidi, at http://www.intelhamidi.com/emailmessages.htm (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2002).  Hamidi’s efforts to bring public recognition to the alleged 
discriminatory practices of Intel earned him Disgruntled Magazine’s title of “1997 
Disgruntled Employee of the Year.”  See FACE Intel, Disgruntled Names Former Intel 
Engineer Ken Hamidi the 1997 Disgruntled Employee of the Year, at http://www.face 
intel.com/articlesarchives.htm#DISGRUNTLED (last visited Oct. 13, 2002). 
 10. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247.  Intel’s e-mail system is connected to the 
Internet and is used for “communications between Intel employees and its customers and 
vendors.”  See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, No. 98AS05067, 1999 WL 450944, at *1 (Cal. 
App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999) (unpublished opinion).  Intel, however, does permit 
its employees “reasonable personal use of Intel’s equipment for sending and receiving 
personal e-mail.”  Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 250. 
 11. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247.  Given the ability of the employees to easily 
remove themselves from Hamidi’s mailing list, the significance of any alleged trespass is 
questionable. 
 12. Arguably, if Hamidi had been praising Intel’s employment practices and 
procedures, Intel would never have argued trespass because there was no physical harm 
to Intel’s system.  Therefore, perhaps it is not the trespass that Intel is complaining about, 
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Hamidi a demand letter directing that he stop e-mailing Intel employees.  
Hamidi refused.  Intel attempted to prevent Hamidi’s messages from 
reaching its employees’ electronic mailboxes by various technological 
means, but Hamidi was able to evade their security measures and 
continued to e-mail Intel’s employees.13  Having failed to block 
Hamidi’s messages or to persuade him to refrain from sending them, 
Intel filed suit against Hamidi, alleging trespass to chattels and seeking a 
permanent injunction.14 
B.  Procedural History 
1.  The Trial Court 
The Superior Court of California, Sacramento County, granted Intel 
summary judgment on the trespass to chattels claim and issued a 
permanent injunction against Hamidi, enjoining him from sending 
electronic messages to Intel employees at their place of work.15  The 
court found that Intel (1) had asked Hamidi not to e-mail its employees, 
(2) had no effective self-help option, and (3) had suffered injury because 
it had devoted employee time in attempts to block the e-mail messages.  
The court thus held that Intel was entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law on the trespass to chattels claim.16 
 
but the content of Hamidi’s messages.  If that is the case, Intel would then be attempting 
to turn a libel claim into a trespass claim in an effort to silence Hamidi’s speech. 
 13. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246–47. 
 14. Hamidi, 1999 WL 450944, at *3.  Originally, Intel had also filed a nuisance 
claim for damages but withdrew it voluntarily and waived its claim for damages.  Id. at 
*1.  The California Supreme Court has held that all intangible intrusions that do not 
cause physical damage to property must be dealt with as nuisance rather than trespass.  
See Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 649 P.2d 922, 924 (Cal. 1982).  Electromagnetic 
waves have been held to be such intangible intrusions, covered under nuisance law and 
not trespass.  San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 695–96 (Cal. 
1996).  Electronic signals, such as Internet e-mail messages, that travel over phone lines 
or cable transmission lines into a private computer system consist of nothing more than 
the same electromagnetic waves discussed in San Diego Gas & Electric Co.  See, e.g., 
HOWARD GEORGI, THE PHYSICS OF WAVES 187–92 (1993); 2 DAVID HALLIDAY & ROBERT 
RESNICK, PHYSICS § 41-4 (3d ed. 1986); 18 MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE & 
TECHNOLOGY 555–62  (8th ed. 1997). 
 15. Hamidi, 1999 WL 450944, at *3. 
 16. Id. at *1–2.  The permanent injunction permanently restrained and enjoined 
“defendants, their agents, servants, assigns, employees, officers, directors, and all those 
acting in concert for or with defendants . . . from sending unsolicited e-mail to addresses 
on INTEL’s computer systems.”  Id. at *3; see also Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247.  
After the court enjoined Hamidi from sending any further e-mail messages to Intel, 
Hamidi dressed himself in a “Pony Express rider outfit” and hand delivered two more e-
mail messages to Intel’s headquarters, one on a floppy disk (which Intel said was too 
expensive to deliver to its employees) and one printed out on 40,000 sheets of paper.  
First Pony E-mail Express Delivery: Intel vs. Hamidi, at http://www.intelhamidi.com/ 
firstdelivery.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2002); Second Pony E-mail Express Delivery: 
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2.  The Court of Appeal 
A divided three-judge panel of the court of appeal, giving more 
deference to the trial court’s ruling than to all other legal authority on 
point, affirmed the trial court’s ruling and upheld the permanent 
injunction17 over Justice Kolkey’s dissent.18  In short, the court held that 
although Intel was unable to demonstrate any harm to its chattels 
necessary to trigger a damage award, the act of disrupting Intel’s 
business by unauthorized use of Intel’s computers amounted to 
trespass.19  The court inappropriately applied the definition of trespass to 
chattels as given in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as occurring when 
someone intentionally meddles with another’s chattel in a way that is 
harmful to the owner’s materially valuable interest in the chattel.20  The 
court held that even if Intel could not demonstrate any actual harm or 
loss sufficient to support an award of nominal damages, it was 
nevertheless entitled to injunctive relief.21  Intel proved to the court’s 
satisfaction that it—not the chattel—was hurt by the loss of productivity 
of distracted workers and by the time and effort its security department 
expended trying to stop the e-mail messages.22  The court concluded that 
Intel proved Hamidi was “disrupting its business by using its property 
and therefore is entitled to injunctive relief based on a theory of trespass 
to chattels.”23  In so holding, the court radically departed from the 
existing California common law requirements and created a new tort 
where harm to the plaintiff’s allegedly trespassed chattels need not be 
proven. 
 
Intel vs. Hamidi, at http://www.intelhamidi.com/seconddelivery.htm (last visited Oct. 
11, 2002). 
 17. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258. 
 18. Id. at 258–65 (Kolkey, J., dissenting) 
 19. Id. at 249.  Asking for an injunction instead of damages does not free the 
plaintiff from the burden of showing any injury.  An injunction is granted only after an 
injury has been established and where that injury is so irreparable that a damage award 
would be insufficient.  See infra note 36. 
 20. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 248. 
 21. Id. at 249. 
 22. Id. at 249–50.  The dissent opined: “[I]t is not too much to ask that trespass to 
chattel continue to require some injury to the chattel (or at least to the possessory interest 
in the chattel) in order to maintain the action.”  Id. at 258 (Kolkey, J., dissenting). 
 23. Id. at 249. 
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III.  DEPARTURE FROM EXISTING CALIFORNIA COMMON LAW 
A.  The Actual Injury Requirement 
In its decision, the court applied the doctrine of trespass to chattels 
without any finding of actual harm to the chattel involved or, alternately, 
without any finding of interference with the owner’s ability to use that 
chattel.  The court abandoned the distinction between trespass to real 
property and trespass to chattels, effectually merging the two and 
radically rewriting the trespass to chattels doctrine under California 
law.24 
The common law has always distinguished trespass to real property 
from trespass to chattels.  In order for a plaintiff to maintain a trespass to 
real property action, there is no requirement that the plaintiff prove 
actual injury to the property.25  In contrast, the tort of trespass to chattels 
has always required that the plaintiff prove sufficient actual injury to the 
chattel in question or, alternatively, some injury to the owner’s ability to 
use or possess that chattel.26  Accordingly, in order for a plaintiff to 
 
 24. The defendant and legal commentators, such as Amici Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and the ACLU, have also attacked this decision on first amendment free 
speech grounds.  Id. at 252–53.  As noted in the majority opinion: “[The United States 
Supreme Court has held that] the First Amendment trumps a state’s power to make and 
enforce defamation torts.”  Id. at 253 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 277 (1964)).  The scope of this Casenote’s focus is not to analyze the first 
amendment issues.  For a complete and detailed analysis on these claims and the trial 
court’s ruling on the first amendment issues, see The Long Arm of Cyber-Reach, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 1610, 1623–25 (1999) (arguing that “the judicial enforcement of trespass 
laws in order to censor Internet speech constitutes state action”). 
 25. As the court in Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek explained: 
[A]t early common law, trespass required a physical touching of another’s 
chattel or entry onto another’s land.  The modern rule recognizes an indirect 
touching or entry; e.g., dust particles from a cement plant that migrate onto 
another’s real and personal property may give rise to trespass.  But the 
requirement of a tangible has been relaxed almost to the point of being 
discarded. Thus, some courts have held that microscopic particles or smoke 
may give rise to trespass. And the California Supreme Court has intimated 
migrating intangibles (e.g., sound waves) may result in a trespass, provided 
they do not simply impede an owner’s use or enjoyment of property, but cause 
damage. 
Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 n.6 (1996) (citations omitted). 
 26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (1965). 
One who commits a trespass to a chattel is subject to liability to the possessor 
of the chattel if, but only if, (a) he dispossesses the other of the chattel, or (b) 
the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or (c) the possessor 
is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or (d) bodily harm is 
caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the 
possessor has a legally protected interest. 
Id.  The rule that trespass to chattels requires some actual damage, while actual damage 
is assumed in a trespass to real property case, is based on the fact that there is no legal 
recovery for harmless intermeddlings to a chattel.  Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64. 
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succeed on grounds of trespass to chattels, it must prove either actual 
physical injury to the chattel itself or a dispossession or disruption of 
that chattel.27 
California cases faithfully follow the common law and also require 
actual injury to the chattel as an element of the tort.28  In fact, a 
California court of appeal recently reaffirmed this requirement stating: 
“Trespass to chattel, although seldom employed as a tort theory in 
California . . . , lies where an intentional interference with the possession 
of personal property has proximately caused injury.”29 
As pointed out in the dissenting opinion, Prosser and Keeton’s treatise 
also confirms the notion that: 
trespass to chattel requires actual damage before the trespass is actionable: 
Another departure from the original rule of the old writ of trespass concerns 
the necessity of some actual damage to the chattel before the action can be 
maintained.  Where the defendant merely interferes without doing any 
harm—as where, for example, he merely lays hands upon the plaintiff’s 
horse, or sits in his car—there has been a division of opinion among the 
writers, and a surprising dearth of authority. . . .  Such scanty authority as 
there is, however, has considered that the dignitary interest in the 
 
(Kolkey, J., dissenting) (citing CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 
1015, 1023 (S.D. Ohio 1999)).  Intentional intermeddling 
with another’s chattel is subject to liability only [when that] intermeddling is 
harmful to the possessor’s materially valuable interest in the physical 
condition, quality, or value of the chattel, or if the possessor is deprived of the 
use of the chattel for a substantial time, or some other legally protected interest 
of the possessor is affected. 
Id. (quoting CompuServe Inc., 962 F. Supp. at 1023 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 218 cmt. e (1965))).  An owner of a chattel is awarded “sufficient legal 
protection” from harmless intermeddlings based on the ability to use “reasonable force 
to protect” the chattel against harmless interference.  Id. 
 27. Recall that the California Supreme Court has held that all intangible intrusions 
that do not cause physical damage to the plaintiff’s property must be dealt with as a 
nuisance and not a trespass.  San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 
669, 695–96 (Cal. 1996); Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 649 P.2d 922, 924–25 (Cal. 
1982); see supra note 14. 
 28. See, e.g., Zaslow v. Kroenert, 176 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1946); Thrifty-Tel, Inc., 54 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473; Itano v. Colonial Yacht Anchorage, 72 Cal. Rptr. 823, 827 (Ct. 
App. 1968). 
 29. Thrifty-Tel, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473.  As noted by the dissent, Thrifty-Tel 
derived this definition from Itano, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 827, “which, in turn, relied on 
Prosser’s treatise on torts and the California Supreme Court’s decisions in Jordan v. 
Talbot, 361 P.2d 20, 27–28 (Cal. 1961), and Zaslow, 176 P.2d at 7, which themselves 
relied on Prosser.”  Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 259 (Kolkey, J., dissenting).  Also note that 
intent is an element of the tort, see Thrifty-Tel, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473, but is not at 
issue here.  It is undisputed that Hamidi intended his actions. 
PRINTERMARSHALL.DOC 1/30/2020  11:11 AM 
 
468 
inviolability of chattels, unlike that as to land, is not sufficiently important 
to require any greater defense than the privilege of using reasonable force 
when necessary to protect them.  Accordingly it has been held that nominal 
damages will not be awarded, and that in the absence of any actual damage 
the action will not lie.  This must be qualified, however, to the extent that 
any loss of possession by the plaintiff is regarded as necessarily a loss of 
something of value, even if only for a brief interval—so that wherever there 
is found to be dispossession, as in the case of seizure of goods on 
execution, the requirement of actual damage is satisfied.30 
Finally, the dissent went on to point out that the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts echoes the need for the plaintiff to prove actual damage to the 
chattel for the tort to lie: 
The interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability, unlike the similar 
interest of a possessor of land, is not given legal protection by an action for 
nominal damages for harmless intermeddlings with the chattel.  In order that an 
actor who interferes with another’s chattel may be liable, his conduct must 
affect some other and more important interest of the possessor.  Therefore, one 
who intentionally intermeddles with another’s chattel is subject to liability only 
if his intermeddling is harmful to the possessor’s materially valuable interest in 
the physical condition, quality, or value of the chattel, or if the possessor is 
deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or some other legally 
protected interest of the possessor is affected as stated in Clause (c).31 
Thus, the authority in California, whether by case law, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, or legal commentator, unambiguously 
requires the showing of actual injury to the chattel. 
B.  Dispossession 
The California courts, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, and 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts provide one very narrow exception to 
the actual injury requirement.  This exception is applicable only when 
there has been a loss of the possession of the chattel.  This loss of 
possession is viewed as the loss of something of value and in this way is 
constructively interpreted as actual damage.32 
 
 30. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259–60 (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (quoting W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 14, at 87 (W. Page 
Keeton general ed., 5th ed. 1984)) (footnotes omitted)). 
 31. Id. at 260 (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 218 cmt. e (1965)). 
 32. As noted by the dissent, comment (d) of section 218 provides that: “Where the 
trespass to the chattel is a dispossession, the action will lie although there has been no 
impairment of the condition, quality, or value of the chattel, and no other harm to any 
interest of the possessor.”  Id. (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 218 cmt. d (1965)).  The dissent then went on to note that this exception is 
confirmed by Prosser and Keeton’s treatise, which states: “[L]oss of possession by the 
plaintiff is regarded as necessarily a loss of something of value, even if only for a brief 
interval—so that wherever there is found to be dispossession . . . the requirement of 
actual damage is satisfied.”  Id. (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET 
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Therefore, in order to maintain a cause of action for the tort of trespass 
to chattels in California, a plaintiff must prove either (1) actual injury to 
the chattel or (2) loss of possession.33   
C.  Departure from the Legal Standard 
1.  Discarding the Actual Injury and Dispossession Requirements 
Despite authority to the contrary, the court applied trespass to chattels 
to the transmittal of Hamidi’s unsolicited e-mail where Intel was unable 
to show any actual injury to the chattel or any loss of possession that the 
court could deem actual damage. 
Intel’s computer equipment (the chattel) indisputably was not 
physically harmed by Hamidi’s e-mail messages.  Further, there was no 
dispossession of or disruption to the computer equipment.34  Intel was 
not even dispossessed momentarily of its servers, and at no time was the 
system ever injured in its condition, quality, or value.  The chattel was 
never rendered unavailable; thus, there was no actual harm caused to any 
legally protected interest held by Intel.35  The complete failure to allege 
or to support a showing of actual harm or actual dispossession should 
have precluded the application of the trespass to chattels doctrine, and 
the court should have denied Intel’s prayer for injunctive relief.  
Nevertheless, the court stated: “Even assuming Intel has not demonstrated 
sufficient ‘harm’ needed in order to trigger entitlement to nominal 
 
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 14, at 87 (W. Page Keeton general 
ed., 5th ed. 1984)). 
 33. The court in Hamidi cited an English treatise that states: “[T]respass to chattels 
is actionable per se without any proof of actual damage.”  Id. at 249 (quoting R.F.V. 
HEUSTON, SALMOND AND HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 6.2 (21st ed. 1996)).  The 
treatise the court cited gives examples such as the snatching of a customer’s handbag for 
a few moments or the showing of a private letter to an unauthorized person that amount 
to trespass.  Id.  However, as the dissent suggested, the court overlooked that this 
authority supports the alternative requirement to actual damages—“complete 
dispossession.”  Id. at 263 (Kolkey, J., dissenting); see also supra note 32.  The majority 
also cited an additional English treatise that it believed supported its holding.  Hamidi, 
114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249 (citing J.F. CLERK, CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS § 13-159 (17th 
ed. 1995)).  However, the dissent responded that “that treatise acknowledges that ‘[i]t has 
been judicially asserted that even an intentional interference without asportation is not 
actionable unless some harm ensues’ and simply states that textbook writers argue to the 
contrary.”  Id. at 263 (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (quoting J.F. CLERK, CLERK & LINDSELL ON 
TORTS § 13-159, at 703 (17th ed. 1995) (alteration in original)).  Therefore, the court’s 
English authorities clearly agree with California law. 
 34. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260–61 (Kolkey, J., dissenting). 
 35. Id. 
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damages . . . it showed [the defendant] was disrupting its business by 
using its property and therefore is entitled to injunctive relief based on a 
theory of trespass to chattels.”36 
2.  Grasping for Harm: Attenuated or Indirect Harms 
The court of appeal based its injunction on an attenuated harm theory 
by stating that the injury to Intel was “the loss of productivity caused by 
the thousands of employees distracted from their work [by the e-mail 
messages] and by the time its security department spent trying to halt the 
distractions after [the defendant] refused to respect Intel’s request to 
stop . . . sending unwanted e-mails.”37 
Evidence that Intel employees paid attention to Hamidi’s e-mail 
messages and were thereby distracted from their tasks cannot be viewed, 
as this court seems to have viewed it, as amounting to the requisite 
actual injury.  Such distraction and loss of productivity is not an injury 
to the server itself or even to its ability to properly function.  It is 
undisputed that Intel’s computers were in no way damaged or even 
slowed down by the minuscule amount of data that Hamidi sent to 
Intel.38  Reading an e-mail message transmitted to equipment designed to 
receive it, in and of itself, does not affect the possessory interest in the 
equipment.  Intel’s alleged loss of productivity of those employees who 
either read or took the time to delete the e-mail messages sent on six 
different occasions over a nearly two-year period cannot qualify as an 
injury of the type that gives rise to a trespass to chattels.  “If that is 
injury, then every unsolicited communication that does not further the 
business’s objectives (including telephone calls) interferes with the 
chattel to which the communication is directed simply because it must 
be read or heard, distracting the recipient.”39  As noted by the dissent, 
attenuated harms of this nature are outside the scope of the injury against 
 
 36. Id. at 249.  As the dissent noted, if the transmittal of an unsolicited e-mail 
causes no injury to the condition, value, or operation of the chattel (or to the possessory 
interest therein) then it is unclear just what harm the injunction is designed to avoid.  Id. 
at 261 (Kolkey, J., dissenting).  Just because an injunction was sought instead of actual 
damages does not mean the plaintiff is free from the burden of proving any injury.  Id. 
(Kolkey, J., dissenting).  In fact, an injunction is granted where damages are insufficient, 
not nonexistent.  Injunctive relief requires a “showing that the defendant’s wrongful act 
constitutes an actual or threatened injury to property or personal rights that cannot be 
compensated by an ordinary damage award.”  Id. (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (quoting 5 B. 
E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE  § 782 (4th ed. 1997)).  Thus, the plaintiff must still 
prove harm to the chattel even though an injunction was sought. 
 37. Id. at 250. 
 38. Id. (dismissing the amicus argument that the receipt of the six e-mail messages 
over a two-year period does not disrupt or harm Intel’s computer systems by finding the 
loss of productivity to be the harm to Intel). 
 39. Id. at 261 (Kolkey, J., dissenting). 
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which the trespass to chattels tort is designed to protect.40 
Intel’s efforts and the costs it expended trying to prevent the alleged 
trespass also cannot amount to the required injury.  As the dissent 
noted: “[I]t is circular [reasoning] to premise the required damage 
element of a tort solely upon the steps taken to prevent the damage.  
Injury can only be established by the completed tort’s consequences, 
not by the cost of the steps taken to avoid the injury and prevent the 
tort; otherwise, [a plaintiff could] create an injury for every supposed 
tort.”41 
In granting the injunction, the court trivialized the necessity of actual 
injury to the chattel.  Intel had not proved any actual damage.  The 
alleged employee distraction or loss of employee productivity could not 
masquerade as actual injury to its servers.  Consider the following 
illustrative example given in Hamidi’s review petition to the Supreme 
Court of California,42 emphasizing the importance of the common law 
requirements: 
Historically, cows have been identified as “chattel,” and a trespass to chattel 
claim could lie for chasing or physically interfering with an owner’s cows or 
cattle.  Imagine that a farmer owns a number of cows, and employs several 
people to milk them.  The farmer’s neighbor, however, believes that the farmer 
mistreats his employees and that they should quit their jobs or demand higher 
wages.  The neighbor approaches the farmer’s property and stands just outside 
the fence dividing the farmer’s property from his own, and within earshot of the 
employees (who are busily milking cows), the neighbor begins shouting to the 
employees that they should quit their jobs and demand higher wages.  The 
farmer pauses from his work and demands that his neighbor stop shouting; the 
neighbor persists.  Meanwhile, the employees pause from their work—clearly 
reducing their productivity—in order to listen to the neighbor’s impassioned 
message.  The cows, for their part, are unaffected, staring vacantly forward in a 
bovine trance. 
 Should the farmer sue his neighbor for trespass to chattel?  It is safe to 
assume that prior to Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, nobody would have suggested 
such a thing, but now the farmer can clearly make out every element of the 
tort.  The neighbor’s behavior is intentional; he persisted in this behavior 
despite the farmer’s demand that he stop; the sounds waves emanating from 
the neighbor’s mouth and impinging on the cows are every bit as tangible as 
electrons (indeed, much more tangible, as sound waves can be perceived by 
the senses, while electrons cannot); and the employees have clearly suffered a 
loss of productivity.  The only thing preventing a trespass action here is 
 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Petition for Review, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (Ct. App. 
2002) (No. C033076), available at http://www.intelhamidi.com/supremepetition.htm 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2002). 
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judicial recognition of the absurdity of applying trespass to chattel in such a 
situation, where the chattel (cows) are completely unaffected.43 
Apparently, the court in Hamidi did not view the outcome of its 
decision in light of this illustration when they departed from established 
requirements of trespass to chattel. 
IV.  ERRONEOUS READING OR DISREGARD FOR CALIFORNIA CASE LAW 
A.  Erroneous Reading 
The court’s decision is based on an erroneous reading of existing 
California case law.  The first California case to apply the common law 
doctrine of trespass to chattels in a computer context was Thrifty-Tel, 
Inc. v. Bezenek.44  The court in Hamidi purportedly relied on this case 
for its proposition that Hamidi’s unsolicited e-mail messages were 
actionable under a trespass to chattels claim.  However, the court in 
Hamidi did not give true effect to the Thrifty-Tel decision and relied 
solely on the seriously flawed reading of a footnote within the case. 
In Thrifty-Tel, two young computer hackers hacked into the plaintiff’s 
computer system in order to obtain access and authorization codes for 
Thrifty-Tel’s long distance telephone service to enable them to make 
free long distance phone calls.  In order to obtain the codes, the hackers 
ran search programs on the plaintiff’s system.45  The searches overburdened 
the telephone system, and, as a result, some authorized subscribers were 
unable to access the network to make calls.46  The court applied trespass 
to chattels based on its reading of California case law, Prosser and 
Keeton’s treatise on torts, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts.47  In 
Thrifty-Tel the plaintiffs met the requirement of actual injury because the 
defendants had overburdened the telephone system, effectively denying 
some paid subscribers access to the phone lines.48 
In Hamidi the court inexplicably focused on a footnote in the Thrifty-
Tel decision instead of following the elements of trespass to chattels set 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1996). 
 45. Id. at 471. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 473; see infra Part III.A–B (discussing the actual physical injury, 
dispossession, or disruption to the chattel prerequisites to the trespass to chattels tort).  
Thrifty-Tel actually brought their claim based on conversion and not trespass to chattels 
because the latter tort had yet to be actionable in this context.  Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 472–73.  However, the court recognized that conversion was not applicable in this 
setting.  Conversion requires that the loss of an intangible property interest be reflected 
in something tangible that can be physically taken, so the court sua sponte raised the 
trespass to chattel claim for Thrifty-Tel.  Id. 
 48. Id. at 471. 
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forth in the text of the decision.  In this footnote the Thrifty-Tel court had 
said: “In our view, the electronic signals generated by the [defendants’] 
activities were sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of 
action.”49  The Hamidi court based its decision solely on this footnote 
and concluded that the e-mail messages from Hamidi alone, without any 
associated physical disruption to the chattel itself, were sufficiently 
tangible to support a trespass cause of action.  The court read this 
footnote out of context and drew from it principles that could not 
logically be drawn.  The court’s reading of this footnote was in 
opposition to the text of the Thrifty-Tel decision and in opposition to the 
cases the Thrifty-Tel court relied on to reach that decision.  The Thrifty-
Tel holding should have been read as it was intended to be read, that 
electronic signals are “sufficiently tangible to support a cause of 
action”—but only when an actual injury is found.50 
Following the Thrifty-Tel decision, other courts applied the trespass to 
chattels doctrine to computer systems only after faithfully following the 
guidelines set out in Thrifty-Tel.  For example, in CompuServe Inc. v. 
Cyber Promotions, Inc., a federal district court found that the transmittal 
of unsolicited bulk e-mail advertisements burdened CompuServe’s 
computer equipment and diminished its goodwill.  The court therefore 
held that the defendant had denied CompuServe its possessory interest in 
its computer network to the extent that the defendant interfered with its 
operation, and thus diminished the value of its chattel, the computer 
servers.51  The court found both harm to the actual chattel and an 
interference with the possession of that chattel.  America Online, Inc. 
successfully maintained a similar claim where the court used similar 
reasoning.52  The dissent in Hamidi cited two other prior federal district 
 
 49. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 251 (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting 
Thrifty-Tel, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 n.6), review granted, 43 P.3d 587 (Cal. 2002). 
 50. The court’s reading of this footnote is also in opposition to the California 
Supreme Court’s holding that all intangible intrusions that do not cause physical damage 
to plaintiff’s property must be dealt with as a nuisance and not a trespass.  San Diego 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 695 (Cal. 1996); Wilson v. Interlake 
Steel Co., 649 P.2d 922, 924 (Cal. 1982). 
 51. CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017, 1022, 
1027 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
 52. See America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448–49, 451 
(E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that defendants transmitted more than ninety-two million 
unsolicited e-mail advertisements over a five-day period, thereby “impairing the 
functioning of [the plaintiff’s] e-mail system”); America Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 
2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that the defendants sent over sixty million 
unsolicited e-mail advertisements, which “burdened [the plaintiff’s] equipment”); see 
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court cases, Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.53 and eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s 
Edge, Inc.,54  for the proposition that “where the unauthorized search of, 
and retrieval of information from, [the plaintiff’s] databases reduced the 
computer system’s capacity, slowing response times and reducing 
system performance,” it amounted to sufficient actual injury to sustain a 
claim of trespass to chattel.  In fact, the dissent remarked that each and 
every appellate court that has applied trespass to chattels in the computer 
or cyber context has done so only where the actual chattel or the 
possessory interest in that chattel was impaired as to its condition or 
value.55  As the dissent indicated, no other case before Hamidi ignored 
the element of actual injury or replaced it with an element of attenuated 
harm that does not touch and concern the chattel.56 
Because Intel simply did not suffer any impairment of the chattel’s 
condition or value or of the possessory interest in that chattel that would place 
Hamidi’s acts within the scope of existing case law, the decision in Hamidi is 
different from all other cases that have applied trespass to chattel in this 
context.  Therefore, the Hamidi decision is a departure from traditional 
notions of trespass to chattels, a departure from legal precedent, and a 
departure from the weight of legal authority, perhaps based solely on the 
flawed reading of a footnote. 
B.  Disregard in the Name of Adaptation 
Perhaps understanding that its decision would be a departure from all 
existing case law and authority, the court may have attempted to excuse itself 
with the adage, “[t]he common law adapts to human endeavor.”57  Although it 
is true that common law doctrines should evolve and adapt to new situations, 
the court’s departure is far more than evolution or mere adaptation.  The 
court’s decision is the spontaneous creation of a new tort, one that differs 
vastly in substance and policy from the tort from which it allegedly evolved.  
In biblical proportions, the court has taken a new wine, placed it in an old 
 
also Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc., No. C98-20064 JW C-98 JW PVT ENE, 
1998 WL 388389, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (finding that defendants caused tens 
of thousands of misdirected e-mail messages to be transmitted to plaintiff, thereby 
“filling up [the plaintiff’s] computer storage space and threatening to damage [the 
plaintiff’s] ability to service its legitimate customers”). 
 53. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 54. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 55. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 259 (Ct. App. 2001) (Kolkey, J., 
dissenting), review granted, 43 P.3d 587 (Cal. 2002). 
 56. Id. (Kolkey, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 247.  The majority must clearly recognize their departure from the 
existing law, which may be why the court goes into a lengthy discussion on the power of 
the court to modify common law doctrines.  However, this power is not unbridled and 
should be kept within the bounds that it was intended. 
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bottle, and clearly the bottle has burst.58 
The court’s justification did not stop with adages.  The court further 
attempted to justify its departure from the common law as appropriate in this 
circumstance because, as the court stated, “[w]e conceive of no public 
benefit from this wasteful cat-and-mouse game which justifies depriving 
Intel of an injunction.”59  However, the majority improperly balanced the 
benefits that would come to the public if Intel was denied an injunction.  As 
Justice Kolkey explained in the dissent, the issuance of an injunction in this 
case “would expand the tort of trespass to chattel in untold ways and to 
unanticipated circumstances.”60 
Not only did the court deviate vastly from the existing case law 
regarding trespass to chattels, but it also failed to satisfactorily explain 
why it was a proper time to make such a deviation.  As the dissent noted, 
the court’s removal, or perhaps relaxation, of the actual injury requirement 
did not merely adapt the tort, but “chang[ed] its nature.”61  As Justice 
Kolkey went on to explain, to “dispense[] with the requirement of injury 
to the value, operation, or condition of the chattel, or the possessory 
 
 58. The new wine into old bottles analogy comes from a biblical parable that 
states: “Neither do men put new wine into old bottles: else the bottles break, and the 
wine runneth out, and the bottles perish: but they put new wine into new bottles, and 
both are preserved.”  Matthew 9:17.  Here the new wine is Hamidi’s unsolicited 
messages which caused no actual injury to, or loss of possession of, chattel.  The old 
bottle is the common law tort of trespass to chattel.  Clearly, the old bottle is not suited to 
handle this new wine.  See Susan M. Ballantine, Computer Network Trespasses: Solving 
New Problems with Old Solutions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 209, 212, 248 (2000) 
(arguing that “it is incorrect to apply the trespass to chattels theory to cases in which 
private network providers, specifically employers, seek to protect their interests in their 
computer networks” and “failure to allege or to support a showing of actual harm should 
have precluded Intel from prevailing on a trespass to chattels theory”); see also infra Part 
V.A–B.  The dissent in Hamidi argued that such a departure from the common law 
doctrine is best handled by legislative action as opposed to judicial policymaking.  
Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 264 (Kolkey, J., dissenting).  In fact, the California 
Legislature has stepped forward and labeled the appropriate bottles into which this new 
wine should be poured.  As indicated by the dissent, the California Legislature has 
“restrict[ed] the e-mailing of unsolicited advertising materials” (which this is not), id. at 
264 (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17538.4, 17538.45), and 
has granted “a civil remedy to those who suffer damage or loss from . . . the 
unauthorized access to a computer system,” id. (Kolkey, J., dissenting) (citing CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 502(e)(1)).  These statutes show the legislature’s recognition of needed 
protection in this area but, in the dissent’s view, also show by failure to extend these new 
actions to noncommercial or noninjurious messages, a “deliberate decision” not to hold 
actionable the acts of Hamidi.  Id. (Kolkey, J., dissenting). 
 59. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249. 
 60. Id. at 259 (Kolkey, J., dissenting). 
 61. Id. at 264 (Kolkey, J., dissenting). 
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interest therein, [is to] extend the tort’s scope in a way that loses sight of 
its purpose.”62  Its purpose is to provide recovery “for interferences with 
the possession of chattels” which do not quite rise to the level of a 
conversion.63 
V.  ABSURD RESULTS AND ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES 
A.  Absurd Results 
The court’s application of trespass to chattels to Hamidi’s electronic 
signals, which did not in any way damage or interfere with the value or 
operation of the chattel allegedly trespassed upon, expanded the tort to 
include many unanticipated, unwanted, and even absurd situations.64 
If Hamidi’s e-mail messages constituted trespass to Intel’s chattels as 
the court held, then trespass is actionable in a number of other absurd 
situations.  Under this newly created tort, all unwanted mail delivered by 
the U.S. Postal Service would amount to a trespass to chattels, for it is 
intentionally placed in the recipient’s mailbox, the chattel is interfered 
with, and the recipient suffers the same injury as Intel, that is, the lost 
time that it takes to read and discard these solicitations.  All e-mail 
messages, whether jokes, chain letters, or personal correspondences 
from a subjectively unwanted sender would be actionable for the same 
reasons.  Telephone solicitations would trespass the recipient’s 
telephone or answering machine, based on the time spent on the phone 
deleting the message, listening to the message, or the space occupied on 
the answering machine.  Even television and radio broadcasts would 
amount to trespass on the owner’s stereo receiver or television anytime 
the recipient received signals subjectively held undesirable, the harm 
being the distraction and the use of bandwidth that could otherwise be 
put to more valuable uses.65 
 
 62. Id.  
 63. Thrifty Tel., Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (1996) (quoting W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 14, at 87 (W. Page 
Keeton general ed., 5th ed. 1984)).  The Prosser and Keeton treatise refers to trespass to 
chattels as “a little brother of conversion.”  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 14, at 86 (W. Page Keeton general ed., 5th ed. 1984). 
 64. See Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259 (Kolkey, J., dissenting). 
 65. Intel argued that these types of examples can be distinguished because Intel 
had ordered Hamidi to stop e-mailing its employees, thus giving Hamidi notice of the 
trespass.  Id. at 261 (Kolkey, J., dissenting).  However, merely giving notice does not end 
the possibility of absurd results. 
[S]uch a notice could also be given to television and radio stations, telephone 
callers, and correspondents.  Under Intel’s theory, even lovers’ quarrels could 
turn into trespass suits by reason of the receipt of unsolicited letters or calls 
from the jilted lover.  Imagine what happens after the angry lover tells her 
fiancé not to call again and violently hangs up the phone.  Fifteen minutes later 
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Before this court’s holding, plaintiffs would not have considered 
bringing a trespass to chattels claim based on the receipt of unwanted 
telephone calls, faxes, letters, radio, or television programs.66  However, 
the court’s decision may invite potential plaintiffs to try, and if Hamidi 
is followed, to win. 
B.  Adverse Consequences 
The majority’s refusal to follow the common guidance in its application 
of trespass to chattels also has adverse consequences for free speech on 
the Internet.  If, as the court of appeal held, an electronic signal alone is 
sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of action even though no 
physical disruption to computer equipment actually occurred,67 then any 
transmission becomes actionable if the plaintiff simply objects to the 
transmission before it is received.  What the court failed to recognize is 
that the computers that run the Internet and the servers that receive e-
mail are all, like Intel’s system, privately owned.  This means that all e-
mail messages enter into private property.68  As a result, under the 
Hamidi ruling almost any e-mail message could constitute an actionable 
trespass. 
If most e-mail messages could constitute an actionable trespass, then 
the free speech landscape of the Internet would be drastically altered.  E-
mail is the primary mode of communication on the Internet, and both 
courts and commentators hail the Internet as potentially the most diverse and 
democratic communication medium that the world has ever known.69  
The U.S. Supreme Court has praised the Internet as a “vast democratic 
forum[]”70 that is “open to all comers,”71 which has created a “new 
 
the phone rings.  Her fiancé wishing to make up?  No, trespass to chattel. 
Id. at 261–62 (Kolkey, J., dissenting). 
 66. In fact, recall that even in Thrifty-Tel the plaintiff did not bring a trespass claim 
even where it was appropriate, and it took a benevolent court to mold a conversion claim 
into a trespass for chattel.  See supra note 47. 
 67. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250–51. 
 68. See, e.g., David J. Goldstone, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the 
Cyber Forum: Public Vs. Private in Cyberspace Speech, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 17 
(1998). 
 69. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Dalzell, J., 
supporting), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will 
Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1833–43 (1995). 
 70. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997). 
 71. Id. at 880. 
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marketplace of ideas”72 with “content [that] . . . is as diverse as human 
thought.”73  Given the role of e-mail in cyberspace, the court of appeal’s 
ruling has potentially disastrous adverse consequences to freedom of speech. 
Moreover, the court of appeal’s logic threatens the existence of the 
Internet itself, because, by nature, virtually every application on the 
Internet must generate electronic signals.  Thus, if electronic signals 
alone can supply the basis for trespass to chattels, the application of the 
tort is limited only by a plaintiff’s imagination.  As one commentator 
noted: “One can imagine the anti-commons nightmare that could ensue 
on the Internet in web linking, indexing, and other routine functions if 
every owner of equipment attached to the network were granted a cause 
of action for the trespass of unwanted electrons on her equipment.”74 
Furthermore, if 
anyone should think that such trespass claims would be limited to e-mail or the 
Web, similar analyses could easily be supplied for FTP, telnet, streaming audio 
or video, Internet “chat” sessions, software agents, indexing “spiders,” and 
many other online applications.  Trespass may indeed be the all-purpose cause 
of action for the Internet; the impingement of electrons . . . is inherent in 
connecting a machine to the Internet.75 
In short, the logic of the court of appeal’s decision stretches far beyond 
the boundaries of the dispute between Intel and Mr. Hamidi.  The decision 
threatens both the free speech landscape of the Internet and the operation 
of the Internet itself. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The court in Hamidi has gone against the overwhelming weight of 
authority by holding that trespass to chattels does not require injury to 
the chattel or to the possessor’s legally protected interest in the chattel.  
Its decision is in opposition to every judicial decision to have considered 
the trespass to chattels doctrine in the computer or cyberspace context, 
under which the courts have carefully limited the doctrine to those 
situations where the defendant has caused real physical disruption to the 
plaintiff’s computer server or computer equipment.  The decision is also 
inconsistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts and with Prosser and 
Keeton’s leading treatise on torts.  The court has created a new tort with 
potentially absurd and damaging results. 
Perhaps Hamidi was not a sympathetic defendant.  Free speech issues 
 
 72. Id. at 885. 
 73. Id. at 870. 
 74. Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 
49 (2000). 
 75. Id. at 46. 
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aside, “spamming”76 is not an activity that most e-mail users would like 
to see encouraged or protected.  Understandably, Intel did not want 
Hamidi openly contacting its employees and harassing them in an effort 
to incite animosity toward their employer.  Furthermore, many may 
consider the unintended effects that would spill over to inhibit telephone 
solicitation or bulk junk mail to be a pleasant byproduct.  While that may 
be true, the trespass theory has many dangerous implications that reach 
far beyond spam and other unsolicited communications.  As expressed in 
the following words quoted by the dissent in Hamidi: 
We must not throw to the winds the advantages of consistency and uniformity 
to do justice in the instance.  We must keep within those interstitial limits which 
precedent and custom and the long and silent and almost indefinable practice of 
other judges through the centuries of the common law have set to judge-made 
innovations.77 
The requirement that a plaintiff prove actual injury to the chattel itself 
should not be set aside.  The actual injury requirement has been the 
standard for many years and has recently received strong support in the 
few cases that have dealt with intangible trespass, thus showing the trend 
is not to depart from that standard.78  Where the trespass is by something 
other than physical contact, the requirement of injury is even more 
important.  As applied by California courts to computer networks, trespass 
to chattels “lies where an intentional interference with the possession of 
personal property has proximately caused injury.”79  Intel did not meet this 




 76. The term “spam” refers broadly to unsolicited bulk e-mail (or “junk e-mail”),  
“which can be either commercial (such as an advertisement) or noncommercial 
(such as a joke or chain letter).”  Use of the term “spam” as Internet jargon for 
this seemingly ubiquitous junk e-mail arose out of a skit by the British comedy 
troupe Monty Python, in which a waitress can offer a patron no single menu 
item that does not include spam . . . .  Hormel Food Corporation, which 
debuted its SPAM® luncheon meat in 1937, has dropped any defensiveness 
about this use of the term and now celebrates its product with a website . . . . 
State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 406 n.1 (Wash. 2001) (citations omitted). 
 77. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 258 (Ct. App. 2001) (Kolkey, J., 
dissenting) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 103 
(1921)) (footnote omitted), review granted, 43 P.3d 587 (Cal. 2002). 
 78. See supra Part IV.A. and notes 47–49. 
 79. Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473–74 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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